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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Trudy Govier’s writings are consistently characterized by clarity, insight, thoroughness, 
and often social and moral relevance; her current paper is no exception. I shall focus in 
this commentary on two areas: (1) criterial issues concerning the Error of Vacuity; and 
(2) the language of continua (or spectra) and degrees as metaphorical or literal in the 
context of argument typology. My aim is to provide fruitful points of discussion rather 
than strongly supported conclusions. I am grateful for the “Objections Considered” 
section in her present paper and shall begin by focusing on Objection Two. 
  
2. THE ERROR OF VACUITY AND CRITERIAL ISSUES 
 
Some key excerpts from Objection Two are as follows: 
 
Pragmatically, then, some dichotomies that are in the strict sense false are useful and defensible as 
such. Degrees of Q and not-Q, respects in which X qualifies as Q or does not, and even kinds of Q 
and not-Q may not actually matter for the purposes at hand. If this is the case, then a dichotomous 
framework will be the most convenient one. (p. 8)  
 
Govier’s response to Objection Two is as follows: 
 
If this really is the case, then the dichotomous framework is defensible in such a context, but we 
should not forget that it is an oversimplifying framework that glosses over factors that may turn 
out to be significant after all. (p. 8) 
 
The word ‘false’ in Objection Two presumably applies only to the Error of Contrariety, 
which is a false dichotomy, due to being nonexhaustive. The Error of Vacuity, being 
exhaustive, is a true type of dichotomy. Some, perhaps many, instances of the Error of 
Contrariety are false but useful, as indicated in Objection Two. Correspondingly 
interesting instances of the Error of Vacuity might provisionally be described as 
‘problematic but useful’ rather than as ‘false but useful.’ But what sense of ‘problematic’ 
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is at work here for so-called ‘useful’ instances of the Error of Vacuity? And what more 
can be said regarding the nature of the normative criteria that the Error of Vacuity 
violates?  
 While Govier describes the Error of Contrariety as involving mistakes in 
“ordinary language use and meaning, correctly understood” (p. 1), she characterizes 
statements featuring the Error of Vacuity as providing “remarkably little content,” as 
“quasi-logical, in Perelman’s sense,” as Dewey’s “infinite negative,” and as “spuriously 
informative.”  
 The phrase ‘spuriously informative’ suggests to me that the Error of Vacuity can 
be appropriately classified as a violation of conversational norms of reasonableness, in 
particular Paul Grice’s First Maxim of Quantity: “Make your contribution as informative 
as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange).” (Grice 1989, p. 26) In A 
Systematic Theory of Argumentation, van Eemeren and Grootendorst provide “speech act 
alternatives” (Eemeren van and Grootendorst 2004, p. 77) to Grice’s Maxims, including 
the first rule of language, “You must not perform any speech acts that are 
incomprehensible.” (Eemeren van and Grootendorst 2004, p. 77). In commenting on this 
first rule of language, van Eemeren and Grootendorst state:  
 
Naturally, this [first rule of language] does not mean that a speaker or writer has to be completely 
explicit, but that the listeners or readers may not be hindered or even prevented from arriving at a 
correct interpretation.” (Eemeren van and Grootendorst 2004, p. 77, emphasis added).  
 
It seems to me that the Error of Vacuity is usefully classified as a dialogical hindrance 
because the classes in not-Q appear to have been addressed in the discourse but have 
instead been effectively channelled out of the conversation.  
 The tug and pull over the proper use of not-Q discussed in Govier’s Objection 
Two can be understood as being between the First and the Second Gricean Maxims of 
Quantity. Grice’s Second Maxim of Quantity is: “Do not make your contribution more 
informative than is required.” (Grice 1989, p. 26, emphasis added) If a speaker believes 
that some categories do not pertain in an ongoing rational discussion, then the 
complementary class not-Q can be appropriately employed as a device for reducing the 
amount of the information being conveyed down to the appropriate level. 
 In a paper entitled Disjunction and Alternativeness (Simons 2001), philosopher 
and linguist Mandy Simons, interpreting Grice to an extent, characterizes a set of 
disjuncts in a proposition as a kind of list such that the speaker is not committed to any 
single item on that list, as would be the case with a list in the form of a conjunction. Lists 
are very context-sensitive tools; the exhaustiveness of a list is often not key within a 
given context and purpose. Govier’s warning regarding the Error of Vacuity remains 
nevertheless very important in selected contexts.  
 Adherence to maxims of reasonable cooperativeness in conversation seems to me 
to be crucially involved in social trust as understood by Govier in her book, Social Trust 
and Human Communities. (Govier 1997) Low-trust societies feature markedly low levels 
of cooperation, at least beyond the circle of one’s family and close friends. Two types of 
low-trust societies examined by Govier in this book are (1) “peasant” societies 
characterized by scarcity, and (2) societies with totalitarian governments. Philosopher and 
linguist Siobhan Chapman in her book, Paul Grice, Philosopher and Linguist, notes that 
the indigenous peoples of Madagascar do not follow Grice’s maxims of quantity because 
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they view information as scarce and to be hoarded. (Chapman 2004, p. 198) Empirical 
studies might well show that the Error of Vacuity is more prevalent in totalitarian 
societies than in liberal, industrialized democracies. 
 Although these dialog-based criteria regarding the Error of Vacuity are helpful in 
my view, further criteria involving pragmatic, semantic, epistemic, or dialectical 
dimensions may also be needed. According to Siobhan Chapman, Grice himself was 
concerned with “categories as the building blocks of knowledge” (Chapman 2004, p. 71) 
Govier has argued in her paper “When They Can’t Talk Back” (Govier 1991, p. 183) that 
the dialogical model is not an adequate theory for contexts involving noninteractive 
audiences. These important issues, and other related issues, cannot be explored here.   
   
3. CONTINUA, SPECTRA, DEGREES, AND RANKINGS 
 
Govier writes,  
 
But the continuum metaphor itself is a simplifying metaphor. Sometimes the models of continuum 
and spectrum are inapplicable. Interestingly, one such instance appears to be that of argument 
typology.” (p. 5)  
 
She asks, “of what are these degrees [of argument strength] on the continuum or the 
spectrum? There seems to be no good answer to this question.” (p. 5) My aim in this 
second commentary section is to explicate three senses in which we talk of continua (or 
spectra) and degrees: (1) a literal sense; (2) a semi-metaphorical sense; and (3) a fully 
metaphorical sense. I shall then apply these developed distinctions to some issues related 
to Govier’s paper. 
 In a literal continuum, numbers both individuate and rank order the instances 
involved. A point in space is both named and individuated by a number, an example 
being the halfway points in Zeno’s famous Dichotomy paradox. A common example is 
the degrees of temperature, which are both individuated and ranked by numbers. In a 
semi-metaphorical use of “continuum,” numbers do not individuate the instances; but the 
instances are ranked by posting some of their measured features to a numerical scale. An 
example would be measuring the height of 1800 randomly selected people and then 
graphing this data, creating most likely a bell-shaped, normal mathematical curve, 
suggesting a trichotomous classification. 
 The fully metaphorical use of “continuum” and “degrees” involves rankings 
created without intrinsically using numbers. Consider a stack of 1800 randomly selected, 
one-page written arguments that we want to rank according to argument goodness, with 
the best at the top of the stack. Initially, two arguments are compared and ranked using 
accepted criteria. Then a third argument is compared to each of the first two, the third 
argument receiving a rank such that both (1) the argument immediately above it in the 
stack is stronger or of the same strength, and (2) the argument immediately below it in the 
stack is weaker or of the same strength. This process is repeatable indefinitely until all 
arguments are placed in the ordered set of ranked arguments. Applying “continuum” or 
“degrees” to the outcome of this ranking would be metaphorical terminology because 
there are no numbers directly utilized in the ranking process. After the ranking process is 
finished, ordinal numbers may be applied to the instances, i.e. first, second, third, etc. 
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 Trudy Govier’s paper has shown us how using this fully metaphorical language 
can facilitate the imposition of a false continuum on categories and thus on their 
instances. In attempting to rank our stack of 1800 written arguments, the outcome would 
likely not be a single stack of 1800 arguments but rather various shorter stacks of 
arguments labelled “abductive,” “inductive generalization,” “conductive,” etc. 
Meaningful comparison of any two arguments in terms of goodness requires significant 
relevant similarities of scheme and/or context. The stubborn diversity experienced in the 
actual ranking of specific arguments can frustrate theory construction, creating a potential 
scenario for imposing a false continuum on diversity.  
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
In her response to Objection Seven in the present paper, Govier argues that her position is 
not post-modernist. She characterizes her position rather as featuring “an insistence on 
context and relevant differences.” (p. 7) I fully agree; her role in this paper is that of a 
constructive critic cautioning about oversimplification and other mistakes with respect to 
categorical schemes and disjunctive propositions. 
 Her treatment of argument typology in the present paper seems to me to be 
congruent with the view that argument sufficiency is inherently comparative, quasi-
quantitative in the non-numerical sense of ‘more than’ and ‘less than,’ and resistant to 
generalization, especially considering the context-centric nature of arguments. It seems to 
me that a further congruent view is that argument typology is substantially based on 
processes of argument evaluation. If these general points in theory of argument are 
accepted, then conductive arguments, which incorporate comparative weighing, may be 
in some ways more paradigmatic in argument evaluation than simple arguments.  
 
          Link to paper 
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